The Hidden Agenda Behind Markets For Technology: Do firms seek knowledge beyond partners?
for a joint venture in OLEDs, then issues over "technology leakage" will emerge as Korea is still ahead of companies in China in the OLED sector."
-The Korea Times, (2015) [Tsinghua] plans to inject a total of $2.6 billion into the three [companies, ChipMOS, Powertech, and SPIL] in exchange for stakes plus one board seat at each with no management control. The offers came after Micron Technology Inc. rejected Tsinghua's informal $23 billion takeover bid on the presumption of U.S. national security concerns.
-Reuters (2015)
The two tech companies in the opening anecdotes have entered interorganizational relationships seeking to acquire knowledge held by their partner firm's partner. BOE has established joint ventures with the R&D partners of its largest rivals, Samsung and LG Display. Tsinghua has made equity investments in ChipMOS, a back-end company that assembles more than a billion of Micron's DRAM and NAND chips, shortly after the Chinese tech giant failed to acquire Micron and Micron's technology. This paper investigates firm motivations to enter inter-firm relationships. A central question I ask in this paper is whether firms engage in inter-firm relationships to gain knowledge through second-order ties (i.e., partner's partner) and under what conditions firms do so.
Scholars have long argued that internalizing partner's skills and knowledge is a key motivation for firms to enter inter-firm relationships, such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, equity investments, and technological acquisitions (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; Hamel, 1991; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996) . However, such an explanation is insufficient to explain why tech firms choose to form ties with partner firms that lack apparent benefits.
Tech leaders in knowledge intensive industries frequently collaborate with partners that retain inferior skills (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005) and invest in entrepreneurial firms with nascent technology (Gompers & Lerner, 2000) .
This paper proposes a novel explanation of why firms enter inter-firm ties -knowledge acquisition through second-order ties (Ahuja, 2000; Hernandez, Sanders, & Tuschke, 2015 (Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016) . I find that IVC investments are not sensitive to start-ups' alliance portfolio when making equity investments in entrepreneurial firms. The result buttresses my view that CVCs make equity investments in venture firms in order to accumulate knowledge through second-order ties.
My research mainly contributes to the partner selection literature.
Studies in this literature stream have long questioned how firms choose partners during inter-firm relationships (Chung, Singh, Lee, & others, 2000; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Reuer & Lahiri, 2013; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) . Literature has particularly focused on the dyadic characteristics between two partnering firms to explain this phenomenon. For instance, (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) ) examine how technological complementariness and similarities between two firms influence the probability of alliance formation in pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Reuer and Lahiri (2013) focus on the geographical distance between two firms. However, firm motivation to enter inter-firm ties cannot be fully understood without considering partner's alliance portfolio. The opening anecdotes show how partner firms can be mere conduits of knowledge rather than actual targets during interfirm relationships. My goal is to extend the partner selection literature by underscoring the role of second-order ties in firms' partner selection decision.
This study also adds to the recent empirical studies regarding the "swimming with sharks" dilemma (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, & Hallen, 2015 (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Mowery et al., 1996) . The entrepreneurial finance market is a market for technology in which investors buy technology by making financial investments in entrepreneurial firms (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2004) .
Thus, knowledge flow from CVCs to ventures is limited whereas feasible vice versa. (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009 ). This unilateral knowledge flow prevents potential knowledge leakage through second-order ties from CVCs to venture partners, an outflow of knowledge which can deter CVCs from making investments (Pahnke et al., 2015) .
Second, literature has not fully understood why CVCs make investments in entrepreneurial firms. Entrepreneurial firms that receive investment often propose an ambiguous value with uncertain technology. I
propose that knowledge provided by start-ups' R&D partners play a significant role in those ventures receiving investment. Although I limit my analysis to a specific setting due to several merits, I believe that my findings can be generalized to other types of inter-organizational relationships as well.
III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Baseline Hypothesis
Entrepreneurial firms gain knowledge during R&D collaborations in two ways. First, the two firms create new knowledge by recombining each other's. Many large-scale empirical studies suggest a positive relationship between strategic alliances and firm innovation performance (Schilling, 2015; Schilling & Phelps, 2007) . Newly created knowledge result in new product development or enhance tacit knowledge held by startups' employees (Argote & Ingram, 2000) . Second, knowledge flows from incumbents to entrepreneurial firms (Kogut, 1988; Mowery et al., 1996) . Knowledge transferred from venture's R&D partners reside in tasks and employees of ventures (Argote & Ingram, 2000) .
The newly created (transferred) knowledge with (from) R&D partners becomes marginal benefits to CVCs. CVCs gain opportunities to learn from the venture's technology by making equity investments in ventures (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006 
Moderating Hypotheses
In this section, I moderate my baseline hypothesis according to industry-level and partner firm-level variables. The moderators serve two purposes. First, I aim to find contingencies in which second-order ties matter.
At the industry level, I focus on industry's intellectual property protection (IPP) regimes. I expect CVCs that operate in weak IPP industries to be more sensitive to start-ups' alliance portfolio when making equity investments. At the partner firm-level, I examine industry similarity between a CVC and a venture's R&D partner. I expect CVCs to invest in an entrepreneurial firm more when the start-up's R&D partner operates in a similar industry to them.
Second, the moderators attempt to resolve endogeneity concerns that arise when ventures with R&D partners have better technology. Under such correlations, an entrepreneurial firm can signal higher quality to CVCs by having alliance partners (Spence, 1973) . For instance, Qualcomm may have invested in Streetline not because Qualcomm sought to acquire knowledge from Cisco but because such partnership signals high-quality to CVCs. This is an alternative explanation that can drive the same results as Hypothesis 1.
Thus, the moderators in this paper provide evidence that the baseline hypothesis is not caused by this alternative explanation but by my proposed mechanism of knowledge seeking through second-order ties.
Intellectual property protection (IPP) regimes
I first moderate my baseline hypothesis using industry IPP regimes. I expect my main hypothesis to be stronger in industries with weak IPP regimes, as knowledge acquisition is easier in such industries. Teece defined IPP regimes as "the environmental factors, excluding firm and market structure, that govern an innovator's ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation" (Teece, 1986) . IPP regimes heavily affect a firm's ability to is supported due to signaling effects. Literature shows that alliance partners serve as strong quality signals particularly in biotech and pharmaceutical industries. (Nicholson, Danzon, & McCullough, 2002) . Thus, having R&D partners will increase investment likelihood more in biotech and pharmaceutical industries (i.e., strong IPP regimes) compared to other industries. The direction of each mechanism is summarized in Table 1 . To sum up, if supported, Hypothesis 2 strengthens the claim that my proposed mechanism in Hypothesis 1 is correct. Table 1 about here
Industry similarity between CVC and alliance partner
Not all second-order ties will attract CVCs, as not all knowledge benefits are equal. In particular, industry similarity between CVCs and venture's alliance partner heavily affects the size of knowledge benefits. The industry similarity between two firms affects their ability to absorb knowledge from each other (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) . Moreover, knowledge of related products and customers are more valuable than that of non-related knowledge (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008 
Dependent Variable
Investment
My main dependent variable is a binary variable that denotes the presence (one) or an absence (zero) of an investment dyad. Namely, this variable indicates a value of one if the focal CVC in the dyad participates in the focal start-up's funding rounds.
Independent Variables
I use two variables to measure the presence and size of the venture firm's R&D portfolio.
Alliance (binary variable)
First, I use a dichotomous variable that indicates one if the start-up has established at least one R&D partnership prior to receiving investment at the expansion stage.
Number of alliances (count variable)
Similarly, I use a count variable that measures the total number of alliance partnerships the entrepreneurial firm has established prior to entering expansion stage funding.
Moderating Variables
IPP Regime (binary)
This variable indicates whether the CVC operates in an industry with strong or weak IPP regime. The Carnegie Melon Survey (CMS) of R&D measures the inter-industry variation in IPP regimes (Cohen et al., 2000) . the venture firm has more than one alliance partner, I use the maximum value among all partners. This is to account for that fact that CVCs are most likely to benefit from an alliance partner that operates in the most similar industry to them.
Control Variables
Controlling for venture quality is critical amongst all. I use variables from the partner selection literature and variables of my own to control for venture quality.
Ex-post IPO (binary)
This variable is a binary variable that equals one if the entrepreneurial firm successfully went public after expansion stage funding.
Following the literature, I use start-up's success to IPO as a proxy for its quality (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Gompers & Lerner, 2000) .
Log(Amount) ($000)
This variable is the logarithm of the total amount of funding the start-up received prior to expansion stage funding. A venture firm's prior valuations will reflect its overall quality.
Number of investors
This variable is the sum of the total number of investors that have invested in the venture firm before the venture received expansion stage funding. I contend that the number of investors that invested in the start-up is related to venture quality.
Number of rounds
This variable is the number of funding rounds the entrepreneurial firm has received prior to entering expansion stage funding. I exploit this variable to control for heterogeneity among venture funding rounds.
Venture Age
This variable indicates the total number of years passed since startups' founding.
California
This is a binary variable that equals one if the venture firm is located in California. I control for this variable as start-ups in California may benefit from knowledge spillover (Audretsch, 1998) .
CVC-venture industry similarity
This variable measures the industry similarity between the CVC and the venture. I measure this variable by using SIC codes. The measurement for this variable is exactly the same as the variable CVC-alliance partner industry similarity, but here I compare SIC codes of the CVC and the venture firm.
Industry
This is a categorical variable that controls for the industry of the entrepreneurial firm. Using SIC classification, I divide ventures into eight industries: communications; construction; electric, gas, and sanitary; finance; manufacturing; mining; retail; services; software; transportation; wholesale.
Prior CVC investment
This is a binary variable that indicates one if the venture has received investment from a CVC, other than the focal CVC in the dyad. I control for this variable because prior ties to CVCs may increase the likelihood of a venture to receive further CVC investments. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of my data. Some stylized facts are worth mentioning. First, the mean value of investment is 0.002, which indicates that about 0.2% of the total potential relationships were actually realized. The mean value for alliance is 0.093, which means that about 10% of the ventures have at least one alliance experience. Table 2 about here Number of alliances. This is a count variable that sums the number of R&D partnerships a start-up has made before entering the funding round of interest.
The coefficient for Number of alliances is not significantly different from zero. This indicates that the total number of alliance partners do not significantly impact investment likelihood, although the presence of secondorder ties does. This may be because CVCs target specific R&D partners rather than seek knowledge from the whole portfolio when investing in startups with R&D partners. In such cases, the size of the alliance portfolio would not matter to CVCs. Table 3 about here Table 4 provides an analysis of Hypothesis 2. The independent variable is again alliance. Using the CMS Survey, I divide ventures into two groups: weak IPP and strong IPP (Cohen et al., 2000; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009 ). I classify biotech, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals as industries with strong IPP, and semiconductor, electronic components, and electric equipment as weak IPP. The coefficient of alliance is significantly positive in weak IPP industries but not significantly different from zero in strong IPP industries.
The results strongly support Hypothesis 2 (Hoetker, 2007) .
The results from Table 4 Rather, the results would be stronger in biotech or pharmaceutical industries as signal effects are stronger in these industries. Table 4 about here Industry Similarity is positively significant at the 10% level. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is weakly supported. Table 5 about here
VI. ADDTIONAL ANALYSIS
Do CVCs invest in ventures with alliance partners to learn from second-order ties or do they simply choose ventures with the best quality? I address this question by conducting a separate analysis that differentiates investor types. IVCs (independent venture capitals) are pure financial investors that seek financial returns through IPO, whereas CVCs are technology firms that aim to learn from entrepreneurial firms by making investments in them (Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016 knowledge from second-order ties. Table 6 about here
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I aim to answer the following question: Do CVCs invest in entrepreneurial firms to acquire knowledge of the start-up's R&D partners?
Building on alliance and entrepreneurship literature, I theorize how CVCs can benefit from venture's R&D partners. I build a large dataset from the 
